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Bergson and Derrida  
A Question of Writing Time as Philosophy‟s Other 
Daniel Alipaz 
University College Falmouth 
What remains to be explored, and I cannot undertake this here, is the 
proximity of Derrida's notion of deconstruction as writing practice and 
Bergson's keen analysis of the limits of language in the face of time, as 
well as a comparative analysis of the writing strategies of Derrida and 
Bergson, given that both share a common lucidity as to the ideological 
pressures of language.  
– Suzanne Guerlac 1 
Introduction: Derrida’s Bergson 
An attempt to subvert the Hegelian dialectic by favoring positive 
creation over negation lies at the heart of many poststructural discourses. 
Following the introduction of Hegel by Kojève, Derrida, along with key 
post-structural figures such as Deleuze, drew upon specific philosophical 
linages which helped provide the necessary concepts or ways of writing that 
boasted this positivity. According to both Patton and Protevi in Between 
Deleuze and Derrida (2003), Derrida followed Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger 
in a way that Deleuze never did. Contrary to this, Deleuze championed 
Lucretius, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Hume and Bergson, whereas Derrida hardly 
gives mention to any of these thinkers,2 apart from Nietzsche for whom he 
devotes his work, Éperons Les Styles de Nietzsche (1978). For Derrida, it is 
possibly this philosophical lineage that helped to provide the tools in his aim 
to usher in a so-called anti-traditional mode of expression that helped to 
characterize the “linguistic turn,”3 where issues were elaborated in 
semiological terms that became a predominant mode of analysis. 
Undoubtedly, Derrida‟s work is very characteristic of such frameworks of 
analysis and ways of writing, while Bergson‟s is clearly not. But such a 
distinction between the two thinkers or modes of writing certainly does not 
devalue Bergson‟s thought within a poststructural context. As Suzanne 
Guerlac writes, “Bergson enables us to return to questions associated with 
temporality, affect, agency, and embodiment that were bracketed within the 
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structuralist/post-structuralist context. He invites, as one critic puts it, „a 
return to process before signification or coding.‟”4 Indeed, if we consider 
Deleuze‟s rewriting of Bergson‟s discourse in a poststructural idiom, then 
we find that Derrida and Bergson share a close affinity with regard to their 
perspectives of language in the face of time as a double movement. That is, 
both thinkers operate with the understanding of a particular rupture in the 
full presence of the present, an expansion of consciousness as a “now” to 
include a constant deferral to memory. In so doing, I will embark upon an 
analysis instigated by Suzanne Guerlac in Thinking in Time: An Introduction to 
Henri Bergson (2006) and show that, while this overlap establishes an affinity, 
it simultaneously marks a point of diffraction with regard to how both seek 
to embody such a concept of time. 
Given the ideological pressures of language, in the face of time as durée, 
prevalent throughout the Bergsonian discourse, it is unclear as to why a 
comparative analysis with Derrida has not been undertaken.5 In Guerlac‟s 
excellent analysis of Bergsonian theory, she answers the call by Merleau-
Ponty to reject the “clichéd Bergson […], when the philosopher‟s thought, 
processed through various Bergsonisms, had become superficial and banal” 
and “return to the old Bergson, the audacious one.”6 In so doing, Guerlac 
finds that because of Deleuze‟s reinvigoration of Bergson in Le Bergsonisme 
(1966), readers begin to associate Bergson with particular thinkers such as 
Nietzsche and Leibniz as an “anti-philosopher,” in that he sought a 
(non)system predicated upon viewing difference as affirmation/creation, 
rather than negation. As such, Bergson becomes easily re-contextualized 
within a poststructural France characterized by various responses to Hegel, 
most notably those from Deleuze and Derrida.  Similarly, in Crisis in 
Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy (1992), Paul Douglass 
develops this re-contextualisation in his essay entitled, “Deleuze‟s Bergson: 
Bergs on redux,” in which he traces Deleuze‟s profound interest in Bergson 
and redefines, from his 1986 work Bergson, Eliot & American Literature, how 
Bergson can be read as a pre-cursor to poststructural thought. Douglass 
shows that Deleuze categorizes Bergson, alongside thinkers such as Spinoza, 
Nietzsche and Lucretius, as one who is able to escape from the history of 
philosophy,7 an escape which represents, for Douglass, the poststructural 
turn in that it is “philosophy turning its own powers back on itself, reflecting 
upon its own flaws, gaps, and limitations – philosophy as an act of self-
consciousness.”8 Moreover, by the mere fact that Deleuze, a key figure in the 
poststructural era, draws so heavily upon Bergson, he inevitably merges 
Bergsonism to poststructural doctrine, most notably his systemization of 
Bergson‟s method of “intuition philosophique,” which Douglass feels operates 
in a very similar way to Derrida‟s program of “deconstruction” in the sense 
that it destabilizes the absolutist terms which create “false problems” and 
“composites.”9  
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Noting Douglass‟ argument, Guerlac asks: “why, if Deleuze could 
rewrite Bergson in a post-structuralist idiom, do we hear no more about 
Bergson in the context of post-structuralism? Why is he not taken up in this 
context as, for example, Levinas10 was taken up by Derrida and Blanchot?”11 
Moreover, why do Bergson‟s ideas today “escape the critique Derrida 
carried out so effectively against Husserl?” when, writes Guerlac, “[Derrida] 
deconstructs Husserl from a vantage point that, to [her] mind, is very close 
to Bergson‟s perspective: a critique of Western metaphysics for its 
suppression of time, a suppression reinforced by discursive language.”12 
Indeed, it is intriguing, Guerlac notes, that contemporary works such as John 
Mullarkey‟s The New Bergson (2006), “where it is ostensibly a question of 
considering Bergson in relation to contemporary issues of philosophy, no 
mention is made of Derrida, even when the two philosophers share 
fundamental concerns in relation to time and writing.”13 Perhaps it is 
because Bergson,  as Guerlac suggests, “has been dismissed in the 
poststructuralist context as a phenomenologist”14 for both his apparent 
appeal to immediate experience along with his attempts in Matière et mémoire 
(1896) and his 1903 essay Introduction à la métaphysique to depart from 
traditional metaphysical ways of thinking in a similar way to Husserl. Such 
an endeavor would alarm Derrida, as he believed it to be a paradoxical 
intention “to restore the original and nonderivative character of signs, in 
opposition to classical metaphysics, is, […] at the same time to eliminate a 
concept of signs whose whole history and meaning belong to the adventure 
of the metaphysics of presence.”15 That is, such an attempt to dispense with 
metaphysical presuppositions is, in itself, a metaphysical act, which 
ultimately exposes how metaphysical doctrines are entrenched in the 
philosophy and history of the West.   
However, following the 1988 English translation of Le Bergsonisme 
[Bergsonism], many contemporary thinkers, such as Leonard Lawlor in The 
Challenge of Bergsonism (2002), argue the converse: that Bergsonism is, in fact, 
a “challenge to phenomenology”16 for its primacy of memory over 
perception. Moreover, it seems tenuous to categorize Bergson alongside 
Husserl, as he never explicitly rejects metaphysical thought, but rather 
attempts, in Introduction à la métaphysique, to define a new metaphysics 
predicated on a concept of time as constant movement or qualitative change. 
If such new understandings of Bergson have arisen today, then we are 
possibly led to believe that Derrida operated in a field where, as Merleau-
Ponty puts it, a “latter Bergson,”17 who was clichéd and conventionalized, 
dominated. It would be difficult, however, to assume that Derrida was 
swayed by conventional understandings of Bergsonian theory, as he was 
certainly aware, if not appreciative, of Bergson‟s attention to philosophical 
writing. In L’Ecriture et Difference (1967), De la Grammatologie (1967), Le 
toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy (2000) and his essay, “La mythologie blanche” (1971), 
he turns to Bergson when contemplating how to express time as a double 
movement. It is, in fact, an interesting dichotomy – on the one hand, Derrida 
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couples Bergson within the metaphysical and/or phenomenological 
paradigms that are contaminated by a conception of presence; on the other 
hand, he seems to place Bergson alongside writers such as Nietzsche who 
are not only aware of this particular contamination but also produce a 
stylized form of writing which attempts to neutralize it. Regardless of the 
ambiguity surrounding Derrida‟s understanding of Bergson, there is an 
unquestionable overlap between their two discourses, most prominently 
exemplified, as I will show in the following section, by paralleling Derrida‟s 
critique of Husserlian presence in La Voix et le phénomène (1967) with 
Bergson‟s dualistic perspective of mind and matter in Matière et Mémoire 
(1896). 
The Point of Diffraction 
According to Richard Rorty in Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), 
Derrida is an “emblematic figure who not only [does] not solve problems, 
[he does] not have arguments or theses”;18 his sole aim, throughout his 
entire discourse, is to expose “philosophy as a kind of writing,”19 using his 
program of “deconstruction” to expose select discourses to their reliance on 
logocentrism. In La Voix et le phénomène, Derrida exploits Husserl‟s prejudice 
towards an epistemological and metaphysical value of presence. As 
Husserl‟s phenomenology aims to develop a philosophical method (almost 
scientific in nature) that would yield truth by perceiving particular 
phenomena, he is aware that he must form a direct and/or causal link 
between what is intended in an “interior monologue,” where ““intuition and 
intention are melted together” (eine innig verschmolzene Einheit),20 and what is 
actually “expressed”21 in order to confirm a “logical meaning” (Bedeutung)22 
about what is perceived. However, as Derrida will show, time intrudes on, 
or more specifically, within, this operation and defers perception towards 
the past. For this reason, Derrida‟s critique of Husserl can be reduced to a 
question of time; any epistemology which views lived experience in terms of 
instants, “no matter what their angle, relies heavily on the dominance of the 
„now.‟”23 And phenomenology, in confronting the problem of the idea as 
representation, is, in essence, confronting the concept of time. Throughout 
this critique, Derrida‟s aim is not necessarily to present a new conception of 
time, but rather to carve out a hole, as it were, to show that previous 
concepts of time fail to fit. In other words, Derrida‟s goal is not necessarily to 
destabilize the phenomenological project, but rather to show, by using 
Husserl as an example, that the philosophy of the West is an industry of 
writing that is impregnated with a historicity of ideas, most notably in this 
case, with a metaphysical concept of presence, which Derrida feels that 
Husserl only garnishes with a new twist.  It is as if Derrida‟s program of 
deconstruction is alarmed to find that any particular discourse relies quite 
significantly on an absolute term to create a sense of order and logic. Derrida 
aims to show this by example, given that he not only avoids the trap of 
logocentric thought by steering clear of “argument or theses” in his own 
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discourse, but also by exposing any discourses which are conventionally 
assimilated as logically stable and understandable.  
In the case of his reading of Husserl, Derrida is troubled by an 
overwhelming privilege given to presence as a “now.” And because Husserl 
relies quite heavily on a static conception of presence to link intentionality 
with expression in order to purify empirical phenomena and draw out 
knowledge of the thing itself, Derrida feels that there is simply not enough 
analysis devoted to what “presence” actually is. Rather, he shows that 
Husserl accepts a metaphysical presupposition of presence that proselytizes 
the existence of an ideality,24 which is capable of repetition or re-
presentation. By accepting such a concept that almost neatly completes the 
phenomenological project, Derrida is compelled to ask: “Is not the idea of 
knowledge and of the theory of knowledge in itself metaphysical? […] do 
not the phenomenological necessity, the rigor and subtlety of Husserl‟s 
analysis […] nonetheless conceal a metaphysical presupposition?”25 Derrida 
is simply curious as to where Husserl‟s concept of ideality comes from; it 
simply cannot be, for Derrida, a “non-worldliness”: 
[…] an existent that has fallen from the sky; its origin will 
always be the possible repetition of a productive act. In 
order that the possibility of its repetition may be open, 
ideally to an infinity, one ideal form must assure this unity 
of the indefinite and the ideal: this is the present, or rather 
the presence of the living present. The ultimate form of 
ideality, the ideality of ideality, that in which in the last 
instance one may anticipate or recall all repetition, is the 
living present.26 
In other words, Derrida understands Husserl‟s ideality as the “very form in 
which the presence of an object in general may be indefinitely repeated as 
the same.”27 In this respect, meaning-expression, for Husserl, would be 
intertwined with ideality, which is to say, the said (expression) and the 
wanting-to-say (intention) would be inextricably linked, which would 
therefore fulfill the phenomenological aim of saying or writing what one 
truthfully perceives. However, Derrida contests this on the grounds that 
Husserl‟s ideality, which underpins his entire philosophy, cannot ever be a 
pure ideality as it is “always already” a “re-presentation” 
(Vergegenwärtigung)28 to consciousness. For Husserl‟s “ideality-as-presence” 
to exist, Derrida argues, lived experience must be treated or reduced to an 
instant or instants of arrested time. Derrida writes:  
If the punctuality of the instant is a myth, a spatial or 
mechanical metaphor, an inherited metaphysical concept, 
or all that at once, and if the present of self-presence is not 
simple, if it is constituted in a premoridal and irreducible 
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synthesis, then the whole of Husserl's argumentation is 
threatened in its very principle.29 
Derrida simply introduces what Husserl had already considered but 
subsequently dismissed in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness: 
“what is ultimately at stake, what is at bottom decisive: the concept of 
time.”30 That is, Derrida shows that by Husserl asserting that, “it is an 
absurdity to speak of a content of which we are „unconscious,‟”31 only 
“demonstrates and confirms throughout the irreducibility of re-presentation 
to presentative perception […] the re-produced now to the perceived or 
retained actual now” – that the “punctuality of the instant” is always already 
fused with what came before. In this way, Derrida only exposes a Husserlian 
concept of time, similar to time as Bergsonian durée, buried beneath 
metaphysical presuppositions. Husserl effectively avoids adopting such an 
understanding of time – the “now” as a multiplicity – as it would clearly 
disarm his entire philosophy. “Undoubtedly,” Derrida writes, “no now can 
be isolated as a pure instant, a pure punctuality. Not only does Husserl 
recognize this, but his whole description is incomparably well adapted to 
the original modifications of this irreducible spreading-out.”32 In this 
respect, Derrida gives credit to the radical nature of Husserl‟s thinking, as to 
a certain extent, he exposes the double deferral that Derrida expounds upon 
in De la Grammatologie, but almost laments his lack of “follow through” in 
that he avoids an engagement with this “spreading-out” given that it would 
force Husserl to turn his gaze to understandings of temporality that subverts 
immediate conscious perception. That is to say, Husserl‟s “spread is 
nonetheless thought and described on the basis of the self-identity of the 
now as point, as a „source-point.‟”33 On the one hand, Husserl, recognizes 
that time is “not severable into parts which could be by themselves, nor 
divisible into phases, points of the continuity”;34 on the other hand, at the 
nucleus of this indivisibility of temporality, there is a constant, 
“nondisplaceable center” or an “actual now […] that persists through 
continuous change of matter.”35 It is, indeed, a contradiction that Derrida 
exploits: how can this “source point,” as an actual “now,” be conceived 
given that time, which constitutes this “now,” cannot be divided into 
“phases,” “points” or “parts”? 
Husserl, however, upon considering this, chooses to ignore it as this 
“source-point” is integral given that it “defines the very element of 
philosophical thought […] and governs every possible concept of truth and 
sense”36 within his discourse; it is, according to Derrida, the “punctual now 
as “primal form” (Urform) of consciousness (Ideals I)”37 – presence-to-
consciousness. By giving an overwhelming privilege to this, in turn, Derrida 
feels that Husserl uncovers a very unique conflict or rift in philosophy: 
This conflict, necessarily unlike any other, is between 
philosophy, which is always a philosophy of presence, 
and a meditation on nonpresence – which is not perforce 
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its contrary, or necessarily a meditation on a negative 
absence, or a theory of nonpresence qua unconsciousness38 
With this distinction between philosophy, as a belief in presence-to-
consciousness, and a “meditation” on non-consciousness, which has 
inscribed a perspective of time as nonpresence, there is a clear overlap with 
the Bergsonian discourse. Such an overlap marks a point of diffraction 
between the two thinkers and can, perhaps, shed a clearer understanding of 
Derrida‟s exposure of time in Husserlian phenomenology. As Guerlac aptly 
puts it, “Derrida deconstructs Husserl by showing that time cuts into the 
attempt to establish self-presence, the presence of consciousness itself”;39 it is 
this cutting as an operation of memory that Bergson presents, and to a 
certain extent, provides a richer understanding of how the nature of time as 
durée complicates, first and foremost, phenomenology, but secondly our 
processes of understanding in general. For Guerlac, Bergson shares a close 
affinity to Derrida, a common understanding, which sees a “critique of 
Western metaphysics for its suppression of time, a suppression reinforced 
by discursive language.”40 Similarly, in The Challenge of Bergsonism (2003), 
Leonard Lawlor shows that “Bergsonism is, first, a challenge to 
phenomenology”41 given the privilege of memory over perception. But, 
paradoxically, it is because Bergson has been branded a phenomenologist 
that he has never been considered in relation to Derrida‟s critique of 
Husserl. “At a conference on Tel Quel, at the University of London,” Guerlac 
writes, “I tried to introduce Bergson into the discussion. This intervention 
was summarily dismissed – Bergson, everyone agreed, was a 
phenomenologist, in other words, of no interest.”42 As Lawlor shows, 
however, despite the fact that Bergson‟s philosophy appeals to immediate 
experience, he is clearly not a phenomenologist given that he feels 
consciousness constitutes only half of our being-in-time; the other half 
survives in the past, as memories, and impregnates Husserl‟s “source-
point.” Such a perspective effectively expands the Husserlian “now” into a 
double movement – towards matter and towards memory. 
Following Derrida‟s critique of Husserl, “presence-to-consciousness” 
becomes a phrase that is synonymous with the phenomenological project. 
Because of this, Lawlor argues that Bergson avoids the category of 
phenomenology on the basis of his conception of presence, an 
understanding that, for Lawlor, is predicated upon Derrida‟s critique of 
Husserl: 
We must here take advantage of Derrida‟s remarkable 
clarification of the phenomenological concept of presence. 
In Voice and Phenomena,43 Derrida has established that 
presence in phenomenology is always defined as […] 
presence to consciousness.44 
D a n i e l  A l i p a z  |  1 0 3  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 2 (2011)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.471 
Based on this declaration, “we have to say that phenomenological presence 
is equivalent to what Bergson calls representation,”45 which is preceded by 
Bergson‟s understanding of presence, as “image” (a term which I will 
explore later) and not consciousness. As phenomenology always seeks to 
link intentionality to a logical meaning (Bedeutung), it reduces consciousness 
to the consciousness of something. This, in turn, enables representations to 
occur, that is, phenomenology asserts that the “thing” is perceived and then 
represented to our consciousness. Such an understanding gives priority to 
perception, where there is a movement of excitation starting from the 
“thing” to consciousness, and then to memory. Bergson reverses this order46 
by giving a primacy to memory rather than perception on the grounds that 
“things” or matter do not have a “hidden power”47 to create representations 
in us. Conversely, he asserts that memory actualizes our perception of 
matter, creating a constant movement between our memory, as an absolute 
past, and matter, as extension. For this reason, there is never a “thing” that is 
represented to our consciousness within the Bergsonian discourse, instead 
consciousness becomes something in itself. It is this something which 
significantly differentiates Bergsonism from phenomenology, and which 
Derrida feels that Husserl recognizes but avoids: to put it conventionally, it 
is a concept of time that is qualitative and indivisible rather than 
quantitative and static. Merleau-Ponty refers to this “something” in Signes 
(1960) as a rather complex “circuit”48 of continuous movement between the 
self, as an ontology of memory, and matter, as extension or objectivity - a 
process of being where our bodies (more specifically our brain) as “centers 
of action,”49 act as “zones of indeterminacy”50 that only serve to complicate 
this movement by allowing for a delay or a momentary hesitation.  
To understand this process more clearly, Bergson introduces the image 
or the metaphor of a “main telephonic exchange”51 to describe the role of the 
brain/body, and in so doing, represents the body as sort of machine. Like a 
telephonic exchange, “its office is to allow communication or delay it,”52 that 
is, a telephonic desk receives signals with the intention to connect them to 
the correct party but with a degree of delay [écart]. This delay, for Bergson, 
results from the complexity of the human brain, which allows for memory to 
intrude and complicate our imminent action; it allows us to choose, with a 
certain degree of indeterminacy, the best course of action. Importantly, the 
telephonic exchange, “adds nothing to what it receives,”53 but only allows 
for a complication to occur in the form of memory. Therefore, Bergson 
suggests that the brain only “appears to us to be an instrument of analysis 
with regard to the movement received and an instrument of selection in 
regard to the movement executed,”54 which is paramount to saying that the 
brain is incapable of producing representations. In this respect, every 
perception, in the form of movement received, would be soldered to the 
various memories accumulated over time. Perception, then, cannot solely 
constitute consciousness as it is always already deferred to the past. In 
saying this, Bergson effectively breaks the synonymy between consciousness 
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and existence by extending consciousness out to include, what he terms, 
“pure perception”55 and memory.56 Bergson writes: 
How is it that this perception is consciousness, and why 
does everything happen as if this consciousness were born 
of the internal movement of the cerebral substance? […] In 
fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories. 
With the immediate and present data of our senses, we 
mingle a thousand details out of our past experience.57 
Memory becomes so important for Bergson that he is able to state in Matter 
and Memory that “every perception is already memory […] we perceive, 
practically only the past.”58 It is in this way that the consciousness presented 
by Husserl would be considered by Bergson only a portion of existence. Like 
Derrida, he seems to view the Husserlian instant-as-presence-to-
consciousness as a constant deferral to the past, and in so doing, suggests 
that the past survives as a swelling or an exponentially creative growth. 
To view consciousness in this way, however, according to Husserl, is 
“absurd” in that “retention of a content of which we are not conscious is 
impossible.”59 However, as stated above, Derrida shows that Husserl, in The 
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (1893–1917), contradicts himself 
as he puts forth that consciousness can be, “continuously compounded with a 
nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation 
(retention and protention).”60 Like Bergsonian consciousness, these 
“nonperceptions are neither added to, nor do they occasionally accompany, 
the actually perceived now; they are essentially and indispensably involved 
in its possibility.”61 That is, perception is not bound within consciousness, 
but rather with memory; without memory, there would be no perception. 
Derrida points out that Husserl, in an “absolutely unique case,” admits this, 
in that “retention is still a perception”62: “[…] if we call perception the act in 
which all “origination” lies, which constitutes originarily, then primary 
remembrance is perception.”63 It is, however, a concession, as if Husserl is 
saying, “I must concede that there is the possibility that consciousness 
contains retention as well as perception, but as this cannot be empirically 
understood or immediately grasped, it is not worth exploring.” In other 
words, if Husserl cannot describe the nature of this nonpresence, then it is 
simply because it is an impossibility. In effect, Derrida shows that Husserl is 
limited by language as a system, given that, at its root, there is a logocentric 
reliance on presence and consequently his concept of time cannot subvert it. 
Husserl, in fact, writes, “In an ideal sense, then, perception would be the 
phase of consciousness which constitutes the pure now, and memory” (my 
emphasis), but, importantly, he considers such a perspective as an, “ideal 
limit, something abstract which can be nothing for itself.”64 He is, in fact, 
right. Nonpresence, in this Husserlian sense, is not something that can be 
thought conventionally or empirically, or, from a Bergsonian sense, 
spatially. Derrida, understanding this, only presents this idealistic other 
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through negation. On the same page of La Voix et le Phénomène where 
Derrida uncovers this contradiction, he uses eight negations to reference an 
Husserlian “opposite” to presence, including the terms “non-now,” 
“nonperception,” “nonpresence,” and “nonevidence.”65 “The fact that 
nonpresence and otherness,” Derrida writes, ”are internal to presence strikes 
at the very root of the argument for the uselessness of signs in the self-
relation.”66 That is to say that any sign will be ineffective in defining what 
can only be understood in terms of negation.  
Bergson accepts this from the outset when he asserts that the sign is 
spatial in nature. In Le Pensée et le Mouvant (1934), he writes:  
no matter what name you give to the "thing itself," 
whether you make of it the substance of Spinoza, the Ego 
of Fichte, the Absolute of Schelling, the Idea of Hegel, or 
the Will of Schopenhauer, it will be useless for the word to 
present itself with its well-defined signification: it will lose 
it; it will be emptied of all meaning from the moment it is 
applied to the totality of things.67  
As Husserl asserts, such a concept of time can only be grasped idealistically 
as an ideal limit, that is, abstractly or non-empirically. And, “despite the 
immense problems [this] poses,” Derrida writes that there is a “necessity of 
taking [it] into account.”68 It is as if Derrida suggests that these “ideal” 
concepts, however abstract or incorporeal, must be tested in order to push 
language beyond its logocentric roots. However, as stated above, Derrida 
does not offer a new concept of time, but rather opens the possibilities of 
new understandings of time in the face of Husserlian phenomenology. 
Perhaps, as Derrida suggests, the word “time” in itself is problematic as it 
brings with it an understanding of static linearity and, in so doing, puts forth 
that we must find a new term: “But what we are calling time must be given a 
different name – for „time‟ has always designated a movement conceived in 
terms of the present, and can mean nothing else.”69 Bergson echoes this idea 
by asserting that the thinker must not rely on solidified concepts for 
meaning, but rather accept that particular terms can and will change. He 
calls this movement, “thinking in duration”70 which suggests that all 
philosophical terminology, including his own of “durée,” “multiplicity” and 
so on will be subjected to change. This is an understanding that Bergson 
presents in Essai sur les données immediate de la conscience (1889), seventy-eight 
years before Derrida published La Voix et le Phénomène, introducing the term 
durée in place of conventional understandings of time in an attempt to 
encapsulate, explore or reflect what Derrida effectively uncovers in 
Husserlian Phenomenology. The difference, however, is that Derrida 
approaches this issue semiologically, as if to concede that the spatiality of 
language is insurmountable. Bergson, on the other hand, injects a level of 
performativity into his discourse through the use of artifice, as if he urges 
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the reader to perform a philosophical thought experiment, which may 
subsequently transform, over time, the spatiality of verbal communication.   
Philosophy’s Other: Writing Consciousness as 
Nonconsciousness  
At the core of the conflict that Derrida uncovers in Husserl‟s discourse 
is a generalization about philosophy as the “history of philosophy,” as the 
history of particular commentaries on other commentaries, deriving from 
Plato, punctuated here by Husserl and defined by a concept of presence. 
Richard Rorty refers to it as a “family romance involving, e.g., Father 
Parmenides, honest old Uncle Kant, and bad brother Derrida.”71 Derrida 
refers to this recognition in L’Ecriture et Difference as an “event” or a 
“rupture”72 in the structure of philosophical thought and comes to 
characterize Derrida‟s discourse as extremely unique, while simultaneously 
making his work, or the writing of his work, nearly impossible to categorize. 
In this regard, Derrida feels that he becomes a thorn for the entire business 
of philosophy. It is a perspective or treatment of thinking that Derrida, 
towards the end of his career, felt was “tolerated [by] academic 
philosophers,”73 who felt that those who chose to consider philosophy as a 
kind of writing were no longer dealing with the pursuit of truth.  
It is by no coincidence that Bergson also found himself as the focus of so 
many recriminations, given that he avoided writing in a philosophically 
traditional way that relies on syllogistic constructions, which convey a clear 
and logical thesis. G.R. Dodson, for example, confessed in 1913 that Bergson 
defied even friendly attempts at categorization, for he was “neither an 
idealist, realist, pragmatist, nor eclectic.”74 Others, such as Isaiah Berlin, 
accused Bergson for the “abandonment of rigorous critical standards and the 
substitution in their place of casual emotional responses.”75 Famously, 
Bertrand Russell writes of Bergson: 
Of course a large part of Bergson's philosophy, probably 
the part to which most of its popularity is due, does not 
depend upon argument, and cannot be upset by 
argument. His imaginative picture of the world, regarded 
as a poetic effort, is in the main not capable of either proof 
or disproof.76 
However, “Truth,” Derrida writes in A Taste for The Secret (2002), “is not a 
value one can renounce.”77 Indeed, Derrida it would seem, in his 
deconstruction of Husserl, not only attempts to recondition how Husserl 
establishes truth, but also how the whole of philosophy has done so by 
redirecting an understanding of reality from what we receive through 
conscious perception to that of a nonconscious perception. In its definition, 
this is paradoxical given that the language at our disposal is saturated with 
the philosophical heritage that operates in opposition to this non-
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consciousness, and is constitutive of time. To write of nonconsciousness or 
nonperception, then, according to Derrida, is to write un-philosophically, 
that is, writing with the understanding that signs come inscribed with a 
Western philosophical tradition of presence which must somehow be 
subverted.  Writing in such a way is exactly what characterizes the 
Bergsonian discourse, while simultaneously giving credence to critics such 
as Russell, who struggle to locate provable theses given that Bergson 
attempts to rid his discourse from the ready-made concepts that revolve 
around an ontotheological belief in the logos. Consequently, both Bergson 
and Derrida share common ground with regard to their writing strategies. It 
is not enough for them to write about how one should write, but rather to 
write in a way where they enact damage against conventional uses of language. It is 
not uncommon, for example, to come across constructions in Derrida‟s 
writing such as “truth as non-truth” or “presence as absence” and so on. 
Much of what Derrida attempts to establish can be reduced to saying that 
truth is a paradox, which is what he attempts to show in many of the 
thinkers that he deconstructs, but only a paradox insofar that its 
understanding is germinated within a system of language that limits 
understanding in itself, hence the reliance on paradoxical constructions. 
Derrida, however, is quick to understand that philosophy‟s other cannot be 
stated in a simple process of negation, that is, nonpresence cannot be simply 
stated in contrary terms to presence, negative absence or as an unconscious 
perception of nonpresence – it is something else entirely.  
In the same year of his critique of Husserl, Derrida published De la 
grammatologie (1967), where, according to Guerlac, he attempts to elaborate 
this issue of time, “in terms of the difference between speech and writing, 
that is, in a philosophy of difference that will become known as 
grammatology.”78 It is in this work that Derrida fashions a philosophy of 
time in semiological terms and asserts that “writing inscribes temporality – 
l’enjeu veritable [what is really at stake] – as difference (or différance).”79 By 
the second section of Part I, “Linguistics and Grammatology,” Derrida reduces 
his deconstruction of Saussure‟s structural linguistics to a question of time.  
Like Husserl, Saussure recognizes but avoids a digression on time, as his 
goal within the field of linguistics is to make language the object of science, 
and not metaphysics. In his deconstruction, Derrida exploits a contradiction, 
referring to Saussure‟s declaration about the nature of language, to show 
that writing has a concept of time/space (différance/trace) inscribed within 
it: “we can say that what is natural to mankind is not spoken language but the 
faculty of constructing a language: i.e., a system of distinct signs 
corresponding to distinct ideas.”80 In a similar vein to Bergson, Derrida 
asserts that a correspondence of distinct signs to distinct ideas occurs 
through a process of forming relationships between the sensory impressions 
[apparaissant] and its lived experience [apparaître] (or mental imprint), which 
becomes a question of a duration in time, or, more specifically, a question of 
matter moving through time; a process of hearing and forming phonic 
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structures based on a faculty of construction. This faculty of construction, for 
all intents and purposes, is the nonconcsious perception of time elaborated 
in his critique of Husserl: “Such a complication, which is in effect the same 
that Husserl described, abides, in spite of an audacious phenomenological 
reduction, by the evidence and presence of linear, objective, and mundane 
model.”81  
As a departure from La Voix et le Phénomène, Derrida attempts to 
embody, through writing, an understanding of this concept of time as trace, 
and, in so doing,  attempts to avoid negative constructions, such as 
“nonconscious.”  As such, he clearly struggles to elaborate positively upon 
this conception of time (trace) that he feels “complicates” both the Husserlian 
and Saussurean project: 
Since past has always signified present-past, the absolute 
past that is retained in the trace no longer rigorously merits 
the name “past.” Another name to erase […] With the same 
precaution and under the same erasure, it may be said that 
its passivity is also its relationship with the “future.” The 
concepts of present, past, and future, everything in the 
concepts of time and history which implies evidence of 
them – the metaphysical concept of time in general – 
cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace.82 
Derrida is, to a great extent, at a loss, confessing that a phenomenological 
engagement with this problem will either lead to a “modification” of the 
“mundane linear structure” already in place, or that the engagement itself 
will always already be a moot point given that the “phenomenological 
model itself [is] constituted, as a warp of language, […] upon  a woof that is 
not its own.”83 It would seem that it is by no coincidence that on the same 
page Derrida turns to Bergson, in one of the very few references throughout 
all his discourse, to consult methodological approaches to this problem: 
“Since there is no nonmetaphoric language to oppose to metaphors here, one 
must, as Bergson wished, multiply antagonistic metaphors.”84 By 
nonmetaphoric, Derrida means that language as a starting point will always 
be problematic, given that every sign used to express sensory contents is 
already removed from what it expresses. He develops this idea further in his 
essay, “La mythologie blanche,” where he puts forth that every sign is 
metaphorical, since our languages of the West are engendered with 
metaphysics and “therefore enveloped in the field that a general 
metaphorology of philosophy would seek to dominate.”85 In short, the 
“metaphor remains, in all its essential characteristics, a classical 
philosopheme, a metaphysical concept.”86 As a result, Derrida believes that 
one cannot escape the use of metaphor in philosophical writing, insofar as 
one cannot escape the history that engenders their medium of expression, 
therefore the philosophical writer must seek to “neutralize”87 the effect of 
metaphor through a sense of play. To explore such a methodology, 
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according to Derrida, “would require [an] examination of the texts of Renan 
and Nietzsche, as well as those of Freud, Bergson, and Lenin.”88 
Indeed, if we look at the first chapter of Matter and Memory, Bergson 
bids to redefine a new metaphysics that avoids representationalism, or, from 
a Husserlian perspective, to articulate the opposite of consciousness.89 Like 
Derrida, Bergson knows that he cannot literally escape the commentaries 
that come to define the philosophies of the West, specifically metaphysics; 
he accepts that metaphysical doctrine is bound within his language, and 
that, any attempt to reject metaphysical definitions will only result in 
“modifying” or supplementing the ready-made concepts on which Husserl 
ultimately relies. That is why Bergson never fully rejects a concept of 
presence but simply seeks to adjust a prejudice towards one that is already 
there. To do this, he introduces his philosophy as, what Leonard Lawlor 
terms, an “artifice,” that is, he essentially starts with a “fiction”:  
Nous allons feindre pour un instant que nous ne 
connaisons rien des theories de la Matière et des theories 
de l‟esprit, rien des discussions sur la réalité ou l‟idéalité 
du monde extérieur.90 [Let us feign for an instant that we 
know nothing of the theories of matter and nothing of the 
theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions on reality or 
ideality of the exterior world.]  
The word feindre [feign], can be translated as: “pretend,” “mould” or 
“contrive.”91 In the 2005 English edition of Matter and Memory, N. M. Paul 
and W. S. Palmer use the word “assume,” which literally means to “accept 
as true without proof” or “pretend to have.”92 Each translation asserts that 
Bergson believes that, while accepting that we cannot forget previous 
theories, we are to pretend as if we do. He effectively constructs his 
philosophy on a metaphorical basis that subsequently “antagonizes” our 
frameworks of knowledge in order to test particular theories.93 In other 
words, it is as if he throws a hypotheses into particular conceptual 
understandings in order to disrupt the habitual use of ready-made concepts 
and present, what Husserl terms “the ideal limit,” therefore exposing how 
language and/or the writing of these concepts has come to engender certain 
understandings of reality. As a result, he is more easily able to avoid 
negative constructions given that there is nothing there to oppose. He 
creates his fiction, or what Russell defines as his “imaginative picture of the 
world” as a device where there is no need for negation.94 He is then able to 
use positively written constructions that come to reflect the positive 
qualitative change that defines durée and subsequently inflects Bergson‟s 
writing with a certain degree of performativity.  
By avoiding such terms as “ideality,” “reality” and “things,” Bergson 
becomes free to think in “ideal” ways about his perception of the world. In 
their place, he introduces the term “images,” which becomes the fulcrum for 
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the entire book. Every subsequent assertion is predicated upon this term, 
which, in its definition, is extremely enigmatic given that its purpose is to 
subvert conventional metaphysical ways of thinking. Indeed, in the 1908 
edition, Bergson includes an introduction to clarify his use of images, 
writing that by image, “we mean a certain existence which is more than that 
which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist 
calls a thing – an existence placed halfway between the „thing‟ and the 
„representation.‟”95 By starting with such a proclamation, Bergson brushes 
aside the two extremes of idealism and realism, discourses which he feels 
have been constructed around particular terms that are conventionally 
assimilated. With regard to realism, for example, Bergson feels that the term 
“thing” plays too central of a role and therefore dictates much of our 
understanding of consciousness and perception. As with Derrida‟s critique 
of Husserl, Bergson is alarmed by the privilege given to one term, which he 
feels reduces extension to that which produces representations in us thereby 
giving matter a “hidden” and “mysterious power” to produce these 
representations. Bergson writes: 
The truth is that there is one, and only one, method of 
refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely 
that which it appears to be. Thereby we eliminate all 
virtuality, all hidden power, from matter and establish the 
phenomena of spirit as an independent reality.96 
By establishing the “spirit as an independent reality,” Bergson 
effectively puts forth that our perception of matter is an actualization of the 
image. In other words, upon encountering an image in the extended world, 
we call upon our memories to effectively understand how a particular image 
is useful. It is in this way that the actualization of an image is a utilitarian act 
– we take only from the image what is useful in the context of encountering 
that image.  In this respect, Bergson reverses the materialist perspective 
insofar as the process of perceiving the image is an act of “diminution”97 and 
not representation. Perhaps Merleau-Ponty states this more clearly in Signes: 
“it is as if my vision developed in them rather than in me, as if their being 
seen were only a degradation of their eminent being.”98 Bergson renders the 
term “things” inoperable by seeing it as a presence that works in opposition 
to durée as constant movement. Conversely, “images” are presence; they are 
exactly what they appear to be in relation to them.  
However, such a perspective would lead one to believe that Bergson is 
an idealist. Indeed, Bergson terms such a perspective a “concession to 
idealism” in that, “every reality has a kinship [or] a relationship with 
consciousness,”99 but, as stated above, it is “consciousness” itself that 
Bergson extends to include memory (l’esprit), and this provides the 
significant distinction between idealism and Bergsonism. It is important to 
understand that Bergsonian presence does not suggest a “now” in the 
traditionally metaphysical or Husserlian sense; it is more an appearing-to-
D a n i e l  A l i p a z  |  1 1 1  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 2 (2011)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.471 
be, in that there is a constant “circuit” of movement between the image and 
memory. Given that the image is in constant movement itself, there is never 
a pure representation of the image to our consciousness in an idealist sense. 
That is, the re-presentation of the image is never a pure copy of the image; it 
is only ever a partial one and thus a “diminution” of the whole moving 
image. Therefore, the image acts as a point of contact between idealist and 
realist ways of seeing; they are neither constructed by our minds as an 
idealist representation of our subjective reality, nor are they purely “things” 
which are derived from perception. 
What is important is that Bergson‟s writing of images, as an artifice or a 
hypothesis, allows him to push the boundaries of our habitual and 
conventional ways of thinking – to highlight the fact that we approach any 
new understandings with the entirety of both our memories and the 
collective historicity of particular language frameworks in tow. As such, his 
writing strategy is simple: he aims not to present an expression of any 
intuitive understanding of the world, but rather, through artifice, to create a 
new “thing” that disrupts our habitual frameworks and subsequently begins 
to form a new historicity of terms, ones that encompass a perspective of time 
as a double movement. It is in this way that Bergson aims, through his 
writing, not to fall into a game of dialectic refutation, but rather to create; 
like all art, Bergson seeks to create a new “thing” to be intuited by the 
reader, which, in turn, will become part of them, part of their memory 
framework and will affect subsequent understandings of reality. 
Similarly, Derrida posits that a sense of creation works in opposition to 
every thought, structure, context or any other conceptual development; it is 
simply l’avenir or what-is-to-come and cannot be predicted, measured or 
calculated. Towards the end of his life, Derrida seems to speak increasingly 
about this concept. In the opening of the documentary entitled, Derrida, 
released in 2002, two years before his death, he states:  
In general, I try to distinguish between the “future” and 
“l’avenir.” The future is what tomorrow, later, the next 
century will become – what “is” will “become.” There‟s a 
future which is programmed, predictable - all that is 
somehow scheduled, perhaps… that is, predictable. But 
there‟s a future, which I prefer to call “l’avenir,” to come 
since it refers to someone or something that will come and 
which, as it “comes,” arrives, is not predictable. For me 
that is the real future – that which is unpredictable.100  
In the same year, The Taste for the Secret was published, and once again, 
Derrida expounds upon this “real future” [l’avenir], relating it to the context 
of an author‟s work: “The future is not present, but there is an opening onto it; 
and because there is a future [il y a de l’avenir], a context is always open.”101 
This Derridean future is a constantly unfolding one, a movement that defies 
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understanding at its very root, but simultaneously, like Bergsonian durée, is 
creative. It is perhaps with this in mind that Derrida presents particular 
writings such as Glas or Cinders as an attempt to convey a sense of creation 
and a type of expression that is more artifice than philosophy - it conveys a 
sense of philosophy‟s other.  
It is unquestionable that not only is it difficult to think in such ways, but 
also equally difficult to reflect, through writing, this creative future.  To 
think from a perspective of time is to operate with the understanding that 
our writing comes with a pattern – a habit – which must be continually 
broken in order to usher in the qualitative change that characterizes 
both durée and Derrida‟s l’avenir. In so doing, we must endeavor to push our 
systems of language to the limit and challenge the institutions that cement 
select methods of expression. It is simply not enough to write 
philosophically about time, nor is it enough to use literary technique to 
express philosophical concepts of time. In this respect, it is understandable 
that Bergson was, at one time, cast aside as a “spiritualist.” How else could 
he articulate what cannot be articulated, unless this independent-l’esprit-as-
memory must always remain as an incorporeal ideal? Similarly, Derrida‟s 
program of deconstruction has shaken the very roots of expression at the 
institutional level; the limits of what we can say about time lie not within 
philosophy, but on the margins of philosophy. To inhabit this “Tympanum” 
or nowhere place is seemingly to be recriminated and unaccepted, but an 
attempt to express this constantly creative future will only thicken an ever 
broadening present to include contextual change. Perhaps, paradoxically, 
only in looking back towards such models of writing will we understand the 
present‟s unfolding future as an articulation of philosophy‟s other. 
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